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WHERE NOW FOR YOUTH JUSTICE? 
Roger Smith, Professor of Social Work Research, De Montfort University 
Abstract This article reviews the current state of play in youth justice, taking particular 
note of the rhetoric and initial reform proposals of the incoming coalition government.  The 
recent history of youth justice and the nature of previous debates in this area of practice 
are considered, in order to 'set the scene'.  In reflecting on past experience, it is suggested 
that there have been certain predictable patterns to policy debates, and that these have 
essentially been constrained within a fairly limited ideological framework, reflecting 
conventional narratives of progress and failure.  The question of whether policy and 
practice in youth justice is best represented in terms of 'continuity' or 'rupture' is 
considered, and it is concluded that in the recent past, at least, there has been a tendency 
to overstate the degree of disagreement between policy positions between governments of 
different political persuasions, in order to justify reforms which have, in fact, been of 
relatively modest proportions.  At the same time, established trends towards greater 
liberalisation or authoritarianism appear to have operated more or less independently of 
the policy process.  This pattern is likely to be reproduced under the incoming 2010 
government's proposed reforms, given their reliance on well-established rhetorical 
arguments, and their lack of engagement with fundamental processes of social division 
and 'othering'. 
Keywords Othering, welfarism, continuity, rhetoric, surface and depth, hegemony. 
All change? 
As the new government begins to map out its policy direction and looks forward to the 
challenge of stamping its own imprint on key areas of intervention, following a lengthy 
period of one-party rule, it is clearly timely to pause and reflect on the implications of the 
most recent change in the balance of political power.  This may perhaps be even more the 
case in the light of oft-repeated claims from New Labour that its own policies represented 
a radical break with what went before.  Shouldn't we therefore expect a similarly dramatic 
shift of emphasis from its successors?  Of course, it would be credulous simply to assume 
that there will be a clean break with the past as a result of changes in the balance of 
control in parliament.  Indeed, this is precisely the sort of question we should be opening 
up for careful consideration, linked to deeper issues of the nature of political power and 
the meaning and dynamics of 'reform' programmes principally associated with the 
legislature.  To what extent, for example, are parliamentary debates on the subject of 
crime representative of opposing or competing discourses, and how far are they merely 
variations on a theme, grounded not in fundamental differences but in what, essentially, 
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amounts to a very substantial degree of consensus?  These questions almost certainly 
apply across all areas of the political terrain, but they appear to have particular pertinence 
in relation to what appear to be highly sensitive and very public issues associated with the 
treatment of young people and their alleged misdemeanours. 
There is no doubt that the incoming regime will seek to distance itself from its 
predecessors, both symbolically and substantively.  Some signs of this are already 
available, in the apparent attempt to replace the language of 'Every Child Matters' 
(Department for Education and Skills, 2003) and the 'five outcomes' in the broader field of 
child welfare.  Initial political manoeuvrings in the context of youth justice have mainly 
focused on the 'failings' of the previous government, accompanied by promises of 'radical' 
reforms to come.  This, we might assume, amounts to no more than the mundane product 
of attempts by political parties to create distance and opposition between each other.  
Substantive and substantial changes are more difficult and probably slower to achieve 
and, of course, changes in political rhetoric do not equate straightforwardly or predictably 
to more fundamental shifts in structural dynamics or social relations. 
At this point (October 2010), we should perhaps be looking for early signs of a new policy 
direction and, based on previous experience, certain anticipatory changes in practice.  
Much, of course, will remain unresolved.  Thinking back to 1997, it was perhaps unusual 
and rather surprising to see a new government asserting its claim to have achieved radical 
change so soon after coming to power, and this, among other things, may account for the 
subsequent sense of disappointment when 'business as usual' became the order of the 
day, in youth justice at least (Pitts, 2001).  Given the rather more cautious and subdued 
mood of the present, there may be some value in seeking to sketch out the possible shape 
of a rather more incrementally 'reformed' youth justice system, whilst also reflecting on 
the question of the continuing relationship between surface and substructure. 
The parameters of reform 
Youth justice occupies a high profile and hotly contested site in the political arena.  It 
functions as the focal point for recurrent and apparently intractable concerns about the 
interface between young people, their turbulent lives, and the social systems and 
structures within which they are embedded.  The long-standing failure to resolve these 
tensions on anything more than a temporary basis means that this subject remains firmly 
in the spotlight.  Within this framework, some challenges, some debates and some 
underlying assumptions appear to have been pretty much constant over time.  
Shakespeare is known to have alluded to the problematic nature of youth, whilst a 
considerable number of sources have identified the problematisation of adolescence as a 
consequence of large-scale social change in the modern era.  Thus, in the view of some 
commentators, there has been an inevitable continuity in the rhetorical mechanisms, 
political arguments and policy and practice tools brought to bear on the subject.  Hendrick 
(2006), for instance, has noted the periodic emergence and re-emergence of debates 
between proponents of 'welfare' and 'justice' which have, in turn, established the 
legitimate terrain for the development of ideas and competing perspectives on the 
appropriate strategies and interventions to be applied.  At different points in time, 
governments and other political interests may have located themselves (or their 
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opponents) at different points on this apparent spectrum, and on opposite sides of what 
seems a clear and 'natural' divide.  Up until recently, at least, approaches to youth justice 
could be viewed and articulated as representing the results of a pendulum swing from one 
side of this argument to the other (Smith, 2005). 
On the other hand, youth justice practices and outcomes have not always coincided with 
the expectations that might follow from the dominance of one or other of these 
alternative explanatory frames for the behaviour of young people.  It is by now quite 
widely acknowledged that the 1970s and 1980s exemplify in different ways the divergence 
of practice and outcomes from the accounts of, and prescriptions for, youth justice which 
prevailed during these periods.  Whilst the 'welfarist' 1970s were characterised by a 
substantial expansion in the range and intensity of institutional treatment of young 
people, the 'justice'-led 1980s witnessed an equally dramatic relaxation in interventions 
with young people, and a substantial decline in the use of custodial measures.  Further 
evidence of this kind of disjuncture is provided by the tendency of practice to run ahead 
of, or at a tangent to, formal policy changes.  Thus, in 2003, it took no more than the 
remarks of an intemperate judge to trigger a surge in the use of custodial sentences for 
the theft of mobile phones.  Equally, it could be argued that the period after the 
introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 did not represent a break from the trends 
initiated in the mid 1990s under a previous government towards the use of more intrusive 
and controlling forms of intervention.  Indeed, in keeping with the views of earlier writers, 
it may be argued that the media were more influential in these periods than the official 
apparatus of government policy-making.  Policy, therefore, may be associated with or 
implicated in change processes, but it is not clearly or directly identifiable as the instigator 
or 'driver' of shifts in the nature of practice 'on the ground'.  Even now, it is clear that 
significant reductions in the use of custody for young people were set in motion in 2008 
without an appreciable change in government rhetoric or 'grand' policy initiatives.  In 
some instances, in fact, it appears that reputed innovations in policy are better 
understood in the form of a response to external developments and pressures.  So, it 
might seem the renewed emphasis on the purported value of custodial measures coming 
from government ministers ('prison works'; Howard, 1995) in the mid-1990s followed an 
already well-established trend, to the extent that this could be seen as a response to 
outside pressures, which had the effect of bestowing legitimacy on practice changes that 
had already taken place.  Similarly, such public pronouncements may carry the same 
function in terms of perceived 'public opinion', as in the case of the raft of anti-social 
behaviour legislation of the early 2000s. 
Policy in the formal sense may have a part to play, but it is one amongst a number of 
contingent factors that have a variable influence on the direction and content of youth 
justice systems, practices and impacts.  These interactions are not straightforwardly 
quantifiable, nor do they operate predictable and consistently in the same direction.  At 
each juncture, these dynamics require close examination and evaluation if we aspire to 
answer the question of what is coming next in terms of interventions with young people in 
trouble. 
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Narratives of youth justice: continuity or rupture? 
Having established the potentially complex dynamics of the subject, it will be helpful now 
to explore the possibilities associated with competing narratives of historical change in 
youth justice, notably the tension between those which are based on underlying 
assumptions of consensus and coherence, as against those which base their accounts on 
notions of rupture, renewal and unresolved conflict. 
Cohen (1985), for example, posits three alternative views of history, social problems and 
social change.  The first of these is described as 'uneven progress' (1985: 15), whereby 
developments in criminology and criminal justice are seen as part of a continuing trend 
towards better understanding and better practice in addressing essentially fixed and 
timeless challenges, such as the deviant activities of children and young people.  The third 
of Cohen's 'models' of historical developments in criminal justice he refers to as 'the 'it's 
all a con' view of correctional change' (1985: 21).  According to this perspective, the justice 
system achieves its objectives quite successfully, as it does for the first model, but these 
objectives themselves need to be understood rather differently.  They are no more or less 
than the maintenance of an unequal and exploitative social order, partly achieved through 
a process of mystification which persuades all but a few that the system itself is 'fair, 
humane and progressive' (1985: 22). 
These two models share the implicit belief that there are fundamental and enduring 
aspects of social relations which necessarily shape our approach to dealing with the 
problem of youth crime.  It is the middle of Cohen's three models ('we blew it') which 
coincides more closely with a narrative of periodic attacks of self-doubt and sudden 
realisations that current practice may be crucially flawed.  Thus, the rejection of welfarism 
and its reliance on institutional care at the end of the 1970s was one such shift, 
occasioned by short-term evidence of failure and loss of faith in prevailing assumptions.  
Similarly, by the end of the 1990s, New Labour was speaking the language of failure and 
the need for radical reform, as Newburn (1998) observed at the time.  On the other hand, 
its policy platform was constructed on the basis of greater efficiency and certainty of 
delivery, what became known as 'micro management, in effect, in contrast to any more 
fundamental or ideologically driven attempts to create change.  The core commitment 
made by the Labour Party prior to the 1997 election in the field of youth justice was to 
'speed up' the criminal process, a measure which was promoted in the interests of greater 
public safety and prevention of re-offending.  It did not, on the face of it, appear to 
presage a dramatic change in the shape or nature of the justice system, as was perhaps 
prefigured by the earlier Labour reform programme of the 1960s.  Although the objective 
of greater efficiency fitted well with what is, by now, acknowledged to be a central feature 
of the New Labour ethos - its managerialism - it did not seem to be evidence of a truly 
radical reforming spirit.  Other aspects of the new government's youth justice programme 
were of a similar hue, such as its corporatist moves towards centralisation of youth justice 
management, its 'actuarial' approach to early intervention (Smith, 2006), and the 
establishment of the highly prescriptive Youth Justice Board (YJB) as a coordinating 
mechanism.  Measures which may have suggested a greater sense of ambition, such as 
the restorative justice-oriented Referral Order, were introduced much more tentatively 
and in ways which barely broke the surface of the conventional sentencing tariff. 
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Pitts (2001) has argued that very little of the much-vaunted New Labour reform package, 
represented by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, was truly new and that many aspects of 
this legislation were no more than warmed-over versions of existing Tory policies and 
plans.  Detention and Training Orders, for instance, were no more than rebranded variants 
of the Secure Training Order.  The appearance of radical renewal was thus considerably 
exaggerated in relation to the relatively modest changes in the machinery of youth justice 
and this, in turn, was reflected in the failure to impact in any way on established trends, 
such as systemic discrimination and increasing reliance on custodial sanctions (Smith, 
2003). 
Longer-term historical views, too, have often tended to emphasise continuity rather than 
rupture in their accounts of the history of youth justice (Hendrick, 2006).  Threads of 
debate and common concern can be traced over extended periods of time, and dramatic 
change in this one field of practice is only likely in contexts of fundamental social 
upheaval, it is suggested: 
[T]here is nothing new about debates concerning young people's behaviour.  
Nor until the end of the 1980s was there much in the way of policy 
innovation, for, as we have seen, from the early nineteenth century the 
central theme in policy discourse was how to reconcile 'welfare' with 'justice' 
in a variety of circumstances, within the context of evolving relationships 
between individual and society on the one hand and family and state on the 
other. (Hendrick, 2006: 14) 
Change may have been triggered by developments in 'late modern' societies, around the 
beginning of the 1990s, but these were not occasioned by superficial transfers of political 
control, it seems, but by deeper lying shifts in the structural underpinnings of society. 
Surface and depth 
At the same time, though, Pitts (2005) has suggested that there are more immediate 
reasons for such changes in direction and that there are distinctive and significant 'phases' 
of development of much shorter duration, which can be accounted for in terms of 
contingent events and influences.  Clearly, as we have already noted, he does not take the 
view that changes in political control are inevitably significant, but, nonetheless, 'things 
happen' which do have a direct bearing on the youth justice system.  Four distinct phases 
are identifiable in the recent past, according to this analysis: welfarism and net-widening; 
systems management and minimal interventionism; the 'punitive' turn; and, micro-level 
'Korrectional Karaoke' (Pitts, 2001).  These are evidenced by quite sharp changes in the 
functions and outcomes of criminal processes relating to young people, and in their 
impact on the lived experiences of those concerned, we must be prepared to take them 
seriously. 
In a rather different way, Muncie (2002), too, has suggested that the material influences 
on youth justice practices are varied and that their interactions are complex and 
somewhat unpredictable.  New developments, such as 'risk assessment' and 
'managerialism', are thus overlaid onto well-established principles of 'just deserts' and 
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'responsibilisation' (Muncie, 2002: 156).  The resulting 'melange of measures reveals the 
fundamental contradictions' of the youth justice system, which have both long-established 
roots in the fear of and demonisation of 'the underclass' (Muncie, 2002: 157), and yet, at 
the same time, reflect the impact of more recent developments, such as the emergence of 
restorative practices, and a strengthened emphasis on the interests of 'victims and 
communities' (Muncie, 2002: 156).  However, it is not only the nature of these 
interactions which seems problematic, but also the weight attributable to distinctive 
elements.  Attempting to resolve such questions is, of course, of great importance if we 
are to begin to understand and account for current and forthcoming developments in the 
definition and treatment of youth crime. 
Signs of change? The 'New Liberal' agenda 
The overarching concern affecting public and political debate in the early days of the new 
administration has been the financial 'crisis'.  This, in itself, might be expected to have 
some implications for systems and practices in the criminal justice arena, but it must be 
considered in conjunction with other aspects of the changing landscape if we are to 
develop a clear view of what might happen in youth justice and why.  It would be 
comparatively easy to read off from our experience of the 1980s the assumption that 
fiscal retrenchment will be associated with a new age of 'diversion', but this may be too 
narrow and simplistic a conclusion to draw and it will not help to address deeper 
questions as to the meaning and consequences of such changes.  If, as some suspect, the 
'minimum intervention' strategy of the 1980s led to a diminution of concern with the 
'welfare' needs of young people in (and near) the justice system (Hendrick, 2006), is this 
likely to persist in the current climate, where there will be little impetus behind arguments 
that more rather than less money should be spent on those whose 'crimes' may be rooted 
in inequality and disadvantage?  How also do emerging notions of 'restorative' and 
'community' justice adapt themselves to a context where there is likely to be a greater 
emphasis on self-help and mutual problem solving?  Will we perhaps witness another 
'new' youth justice in the making? 
Political shifts have been signalled from the early days of the new administration.  In a 
series of speeches, the Minister of Justice, Kenneth Clarke, set out the basis for his 
rejection of the previous consensus on the value of incarceration.  He spoke of the current 
population of 85,000 in prison as being 'astonishing' and a figure which it would have been 
'ridiculous' to predict at the time of his previous term as Home Secretary in 1992 (The 
Guardian, 30 June 2010).  At this point, he seemed to be marking out a decisive break 
from the position adopted by his predecessors in both main political parties, using 
language to suggest that he and the new government were committed to 'radical' changes 
that would lead to a 'rehabilitation revolution'.  He expressed his desire also to break away 
from the political stalemate whereby policy-making in criminal justice had been reduced 
to a competition over which government could spend more and lock up more people for 
longer.  Whilst he did offer pragmatic justifications for the change of direction signposted, 
such as the cost of custody and the damaging consequences of excessive use of 
imprisonment, he also began to speak of the purposes and objectives of the justice system 
in terms which had not been used quite so openly for some time; 'rehabilitation' was 
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rehabilitated and concerns for offenders' 'jobs', 'homes' and 'families' also came to the 
fore. 
Of course, one speech alone could not be expected to shift the balance of opinion, either 
within or beyond the confines of the minister's own party, especially because his position 
was immediately attacked by his opposite number, Jack Straw, who was only too ready to 
re-enter the competition about who could look up more offenders for longer: 'does 
anyone seriously believe that crime would have come down and stayed down without 
those extra prison places [created by Labour]?', he asked (Daily Mail, 30 June 2010), 
conjuring up recollections of the familiar phrase 'prison works', associated with the former 
Conservative Home Secretary of the mid-1990s, Michael Howard.  Howard himself was 
quick to join the fray, being quoted on the same day reasserting his commitment to 
custody: 
I am not convinced by his [Clarke's] speech.  Serious and persistent criminals 
need to be put in prison. When I was home secretary crime went down as the 
prison population started to go up. (quoted in The Guardian, 30 June 2010) 
The task facing Clarke, then, was to try and create some sort of political consensus in the 
face of this prevailing orthodoxy, both in terms of pre-existing beliefs and the 'evidence' to 
support them.  So, his next step, in a speech to the judiciary, was to begin to dismantle 
this wall of opposition by referring firstly to the absence of any clear correlation between 
prison numbers and crime rates.  He observed that crime had fallen 'throughout most of 
the western world in the 1990s', irrespective of the prevailing sentencing practices in the 
countries concerned (The Guardian, 14 July 2010), suggesting instead that economic 
prosperity might be a more likely contributor to such trends (and claiming credit for this as 
a former Chancellor of the Exchequer!). 
Joining him on the offensive was the Home Secretary, who was also keen to associate 
excessive use of criminal sanctions with the over-intrusive ethos of the previous New 
Labour administration.  Theresa May chose the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) and 
associated measures as the focal point for her attack, suggesting that Labour had 
introduced a 'ludicrous list' of sanctions targeted at anti-social behaviour, which were 
poorly understood, even by professionals, variably applied depending on the area of the 
country concerned, 'too complex and bureaucratic', and 'they too often criminalised 
young people unnecessarily, acting as a conveyor belt to serious crime and prison' (The 
Guardian, 28 July 2010).  Excessive use of criminalising interventions is thus carefully 
associated with the failings of the previous government in terms of its supposedly 
excessive interventionism, its wasteful use of resources, and its inefficiencies (in the sense 
of criminalising young people rather than preventing crime).  Like Clarke, the Home 
Secretary was beginning to speak of measures which would be rehabilitative and 
'restorative', rather than 'criminalising and coercive'. 
Organising consent? 
What is emerging here appears to be a carefully constructed portrayal, which conflates 
the failures and excesses of the previous government with an overuse of 
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counterproductive coercive sanctions that cannot hope to achieve their stated aims.  
Thus, in addressing the party faithful at the Tory conference in 2010, Clarke began by 
highlighting again the 'disgraceful waste' which his government had inherited from its 
predecessor, framing his new justice policy in the context of a need to reduce costs.  
However, for him, it would not simply be a matter of 'doing less of' what the previous 
Labour administration had done, but doing 'better' with less.  Nodding in the direction of 
his party's hardliners, he reiterated the view that 'career criminals and violent, dangerous 
criminals should be in prison – not roaming our streets' (speech to Conservative Party 
Conference, 5 October 2010), bringing to mind a similar pronouncement from his earlier 
spell as Home Secretary, when he announced an expansion of the secure estate for 'really 
persistent, nasty little juvenile offenders' (The Independent, 28 February 1993).  Indeed, 
the language used most recently suggests another well-established 'hegemonic' (Gramsci, 
1971) strategy is being brought into play yet again, and this is to distinguish between the 
'criminals who should be locked up' because their offences are serious or because they are 
'dangerous', and those who 'don't need to be locked up', for whom 'tougher and more 
effective' community disposals are the appropriate option (speech to Conservative Party 
Conference, 5 October 2010).  'Bifurcation' of this kind has been a feature of policy-
making in criminal justice for some time now (see Bottoms, 1977). 
In constructing an alternative model of intervention, the two ministers were clearly also 
guided by what they deemed to be 'acceptable' ways of representing intervention 
strategies, and that is to employ the language of reform and prevention.  Later in his 
conference speech, Clarke again drew on the imagery of 'need' and disadvantage to justify 
his favoured welfare-oriented approach, referring to the very many prisoners with mental 
health problems or educational difficulties. 
Clarke subsequently committed himself to reducing the prison population by at least 
3,000, with Treasury support, significantly (The Guardian, 20 October 2010).  Money 
would be saved at the same time as the 'rehabilitation revolution' would be initiated.  The 
aim of the new welfare measures outlined (see Ministry of Justice, 2010: 68) would be to 
provide the most effective means of working with 'difficult, inadequate, not very nice' 
people to make sure they do not re-offend (The Guardian, 30 June 2010), rather than 
simply the most punitive. 
The strategy adopted here to 'organise consent' appears to have three strands.  First, the 
position inherited by the incoming government is associated with the failures and 
inefficiencies of the previous New Labour administration, and so the 'overuse' of custody 
can be attributed to its excessive interventionism, as opposed to the much less persuasive 
argument that it had been too 'tough on crime'.  Second, there has been a renewed 
emphasis on the need to distinguish ('bifurcate') betweens serious and dangerous 
criminals, and those who are simply clogging up the system, probably to their and our 
detriment.  Finally, this latter group becomes ripe once again for 'welfarist' arguments, 
which emphasise the importance of rehabilitation and reform and their preventive 
qualities.  Notably, these are strategies which have been deployed in various forms over 
an extended historical period and may thus indicate the limits of the repertoire of 
available justifications for policy change.  Restorative interventions, by contrast, are given 
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a brief and essentially cursory mention by ministers in the new government and do not 
seem to have displaced traditional polarities.  The principal focus of the policy proposals 
set out specifically for young people by the Justice Secretary is articulated in terms of 'a 
joined up approach to address the multiple disadvantages that many young offenders 
have and the chaotic lifestyles that many lead (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 68). 
Changing direction or going with the flow? 
Support for the approach being developed by the Justice Secretary is available elsewhere 
and helps to create a sense of direction for this policy agenda.  For instance, the 2010 
Conservative election manifesto made commitments to 'reduce the causes of crime', to 
'deal with anti-social behaviour without criminalising young people unnecessarily', and to 
'help (my emphasis) young offenders go straight' (Conservative Party, 2010).  Authoritative 
support is also offered by the right-leaning think tank, the Centre for Social Justice, which 
has repeatedly expressed concern about the social factors linked with youth offending, 
and the recognition that custodial settings act as 'colleges of crime' (CSJ Press Release, 4 
February 2010). 
The liberal flavour of many of these pronouncements may be surprising to some but it 
clearly represents a concerted attempt to create the impression that government is taking 
the initiative to promote change.  A more cynical view might be that this approach is more 
reactive than proactive and that many of the new directions signalled are, in reality, 
aligned with trends which have already been established, and pre-date the change of 
government.  From a consistent level at around 2,800 over a number of years, the use of 
custody for under 18-year olds fell sharply by about 25% from mid-2009.  There was a 19% 
fall in the number of young offenders processed formally between 2005/2006 and 
2008/2009 (YJB, 2010: 2), and it seems this trend has continued, fuelled by the Youth 
Restorative Disposal available to the police since 2008.  The use of ASBOs has also been in 
decline since 2005 (The Guardian, 28 July 2010).  In other words, it would be too simplistic 
to associate the Labour government with a monolithic strategy of interventionism or to 
identify a distinct break in criminal justice practices with a change of government.  Indeed, 
it seems more likely that many of the changes identified are rooted in pragmatic attempts 
to respond to other, predominantly economic, drivers.  If this is the case, then what we 
may be observing is a process of rationalisation, whereby the incoming government finds 
suitable rhetorical and ideological devices to justify a continuation of pre-existing 
developments, mirroring in reverse a similar pattern of events before and after 1997. 
Perhaps then, the recent ministerial pronouncements are of interest more because of 
their symbolic content than because of their direct impact in the field of youth justice.  In 
this respect, it is significant that the discourses drawn upon are familiar, and have their 
roots in well-established historical debates.  This suggests that there is a relatively 
restricted repertoire available from which to draw upon when advancing rationalisations 
in support of specific policy options.  The reversion to the terrain of 'welfare vs. Justice' 
(Smith, 2005) rather seems to give support for those who argue that we are observing an 
essentially 'cyclical' process (Bernard, 1992), and that this opposition has set the terms of 
engagement over an extended historical period.  Even the recent 'punitive turn' appears 
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as no more than a particularly abrupt swing towards one end of the continuum, according 
to this view: 
Because only a limited number of policies are possible to begin with, the 
result is that the juvenile justice system tends to cycle back and forth 
between harshness and leniency. (Bernard, 1992: 39) 
Certainly in the political sphere, debate is circumscribed by particular parameters, which 
we may be able to identify in broad terms: individualisation, criminalisation, classification, 
offender focus, behavioural change.  Whether viewed through a 'justice' or a 'welfare' 
lens, these will be common features of conventional attempts to account for and address 
problematic actions associated with young people.  Change is only possible within this 
kind of explanatory framework, apparently, and alternative ways of approaching the 
subject are implicitly excluded from consideration. 
What will change, and what won't? 
Beyond the sound and fury of public political debate, what changes in youth justice might 
we expect, then, and what sorts of changes are effectively excluded from the agenda 
because they lie outside the established field of debate? 
The 'bifurcatory' arguments being advanced share much with their predecessors in the 
1980s and appear to be consistent with a political imperative to shrink the state and save 
money; they are also consistent with already established trends to reduce levels of 
intervention, as we have observed.  These are likely to gain ground and provide cover for 
politicians who want to demonstrate that they have not 'gone soft' on crime but, rather, 
are targeting their predecessors' waste and incompetence.  We can, therefore, expect the 
re-emergence and re-legitimisation of 'diversion' in some form, as is already being piloted 
in some parts of the country. 
At the same time, the renewed articulation of the importance of 'rehabilitation' poses 
more substantial challenges to government because it implies increased investment in 
welfare services on the one hand and appears insufficiently punitive on the other.  Clearly, 
bifurcation helps to some extent here, re-establishing the historical distinction between 
'deserving' and 'undeserving' cases (Hendrick, 2006), but this alone does not provide 
adequate justification for major investment in reform programmes.  The first moves in this 
direction seem to be an attempt to incorporate market principles into the equation with 
the suggestion that programmes will be paid for 'by results'.  Only 'successful' 
rehabilitation schemes will be guaranteed continued funding if this kind of initiative is 
widely implemented (Kenneth Clarke, speech to Conservative Conference, 5 October 
2010).  However, it is unclear whether this particular aspect of the reforms will do any 
more than create additional and possibly perverse incentives to sharpen the distinction 
between those who offer the prospect of successful rehabilitative outcomes and those 
whose prospects are less promising.  In other words, market forces may actually serve to 
reinforce rather than resolve bifurcatory tendencies. 
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The 2010 Green Paper and beyond 
Having prepared the ground for reform by emphasising recent failures (we, or rather, 
they, 'blew it'; Cohen, 1985), the government moved swiftly to issue the Green Paper, 
tellingly entitled 'Breaking the Cycle'.  The proposals in respect of youth justice were 
essentially pragmatic, albeit liberal sounding, and qualified by one or two choice rhetorical 
flourishes to appease the Tory right wing. 
The main thrust of the planned reforms is straightforward.  The intention is to reduce the 
costly reliance on custody at one end of the spectrum and minimise the number of 
unnecessary, intrusive and ineffective interventions at the other.  Budget savings are 
clearly a key consideration, but it is also possible to detect a degree of conceptual 
coherence in the measures put forward in support of this.  'Rehabilitation' continues to 
feature strongly in the detail, and there is also a renewed interest in diversionary 
interventions and informal 'community-based' responses to minor infractions: 
An informal intervention could be more effective in making the young person 
face up to the consequences of their crime, provide reparation for victims 
and prevent further offending. (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 68) 
It is, of course, too early yet to know how these intentions will be played out in practice, 
but it seems that there is a significant prospect of a change of direction in the policy 
domain regarding the treatment of young offenders.  On the other hand, there is also no 
doubt that the measures proposed draw, to a substantial degree, on the well-established 
logic of welfarism allied with financially-driven expediency.  In other words, the inherent 
tensions between 'surface' and 'depth' remain, with much sound and fury very likely to 
signify nothing of any real substance. 
As much as anything, this serves to confirm both the limits of reform within conventional 
political debate and, in parallel with this, a persistent failure to engage with more 
fundamental and intractable problems in the classification and treatment of young 
offenders.  The processes and functions of 'othering' (Garland, 2001) are too deep-rooted 
to be significantly affected by a reform programme, whose terms of reference and 
aspirations are constrained by a narrowly-defined political consensus about what (or, 
more accurately, who) constitutes 'the problem'.  More promising models of practice have 
been documented over the years (Smith, 2011), and it is possible that they, too, will gain 
ground in a period of political uncertainty, economic uncertainty and ideological 
confusion.  However, in order to achieve this kind of change, clear principled arguments, 
grounded in a children's rights framework, and a strong coalition of support will need to 
be marshalled to create political space for the implementation and documentation of 
alternative models of 'effective' practice. 
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